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Abstract 
The unfolding of pandemic influenza A(H1N1) for Fall 2009 in the Northern Hemisphere is 
still uncertain. Plans for vaccination campaigns and vaccine trials are underway, with the 
first batches expected to be available early October. Several studies point to the possibility 
of an anticipated pandemic peak that could undermine the effectiveness of vaccination 
strategies. 
Here we use a structured global epidemic and mobility metapopulation model to assess 
the effectiveness of massive vaccination campaigns for the Fall/Winter 2009. Mitigation 
effects are explored depending on the interplay between the predicted pandemic evolution 
and the expected delivery of vaccines. The model is calibrated using recent estimates on 
the transmissibility of the new A(H1N1) influenza. Results show that if additional 
intervention strategies were not used to delay the time of pandemic peak, vaccination may 
not be able to considerably reduce the cumulative number of cases, even when the mass 
vaccination campaign is started as early as mid-October. Prioritized vaccination would be 
crucial in slowing down the pandemic evolution and reducing its burden. 
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Introduction 
With decreasing trends for pandemic H1N1 cases reported in most of the Southern 
Hemisphere countries, the concerns regarding the epidemic evolution are now focusing on 
the influenza activity during Fall 2009 in the Northern Hemisphere [1-3]. The future 
unfolding of a pandemic is dominated by a large degree of uncertainty, however several 
studies and technical reports recently outlined a likely course of the pandemic in the next 
few months, identifying plausible scenarios and quantifying the expected impact on the 
population [4-8]. The modeling approaches in these studies are characterized by the 
likelihood of an early epidemic activity in the Northern Hemisphere, with the peak expected 
to occur in October/November. As an effective line of defense against influenza epidemics 
most of the countries are planning the vaccination of a large fraction of the population [9]. 
Started after the virus identification at the end of April 2009, the vaccine development and 
production is well under way and recently received the approval by the US Food and 
Drugs Administration [10].  Vaccine delivery is scheduled to start in early or mid-October 
[10] in several countries, but the expected timing of the pandemic influenza activity 
predicted to peak in October/November puts at risk the effectiveness of mass vaccination 
as a control strategy.  
Here we use the Global Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM) model [7,11] to assess the effect 
of mass vaccination on the predicted pandemic evolution, given the expected vaccine 
availability and timing of distribution. In Ref. [7], the GLEaM model has been used to 
perform a Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the transmission potential of the current 
H1N1 pandemic and provide predictions on the unfolding of the current pandemic. Here 
we use the model and predicted patterns of global spread obtained in Ref.[7] to quantify 
the mitigation effect of mass vaccination campaigns and combined strategies under 
different scenarios.  
 
Methods 
Baseline model. In order to provide pandemic scenarios and test the implementation of 
mitigation strategies we use the global epidemic and mobility model (GLEaM), based on a 
spatially structured meta-population approach [7,12-23] in which the world is divided into 
geographical regions defining a subpopulation network where connections among 
subpopulations represent the individual fluxes due to the transportation and mobility 
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infrastructures. GLEaM integrates three different data layers [7,11]: (i) the population layer 
at a scale of !° based on the high-resolution population database of the ”Gridded 
Population of the World” project of SEDAC (Columbia University) [24]; (ii) the 
transportation mobility layer integrating air travel mobility from the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) [25] and OAG [26] databases, and the commuting patterns 
and local transportation modes obtained from the data collected and analyzed from more 
than 30 countries in 5 continents in the world [7,11]; (iii) the epidemic layer that defines the 
disease and population dynamics. The resulting model includes 3362 georeferenced 
subpopulations centered around major transportation hubs in 220 different countries 
[7,11]. 
The model simulates short range mobility between subpopulations with a time scale 
separation approach that defines the effective force of infections in connected 
subpopulations [7,11,27,28]. The airline  mobility from one subpopulation to another is 
modeled by an individual based stochastic procedure in which the number of passengers 
of each compartment traveling from a subpopulation j to a subpopulation l is an integer 
random variable defined by the actual data from the airline transportation database. The 
infection dynamics takes place within each subpopulation and assumes the classic 
influenza-like-illness compartmentalization in which each individual is classified by one of 
the following discrete states: susceptible, latent, symptomatic infectious, asymptomatic 
infectious, permanently recovered/removed [29,30].  The model assumes that the latent 
period is equivalent to the incubation period and that no secondary transmissions occur 
during the incubation period. All transitions are modeled through binomial and multinomial 
processes to ensure the discrete and stochastic nature of the processes [7,11]. 
Asymptomatic individuals are considered as a fraction pa=33% of the infectious individuals 
generated in the model and assumed to infect with a relative infectiousness of 
 
[30-32]. Change in traveling behavior after the onset of symptoms is modeled with the 
probability  set to 50% that individuals would stop travelling when ill [30] (see Figure 
1 for a detailed description of the compartmentalization). Effects of variations of these 
parameters are studied and discussed in the Supplementary Information. In the model we 
use values of generation time interval and transmissibility according to the estimates of 
[7,8]. In particular, we use the reproductive number R0=1.75 with the generation interval 
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set to 3.6 days (average latency period of 1.1 days and an average infectious period of 2.5 
days) [7]. It is important to remark that the best estimate of the reproductive number refers 
to the reference value that has to be rescaled by the seasonality scaling function. 
Seasonality is considered in the model by means of a sinusoidal forcing of the 
reproductive number, with a scaling factor ranging from !min during Summer season to 
!max during Winter season [16]. Here we consider !max=1.1 and !min in the range 0.6 to 
0.7, that is the best estimate obtained from the correlation analysis on the chronology of 93 
countries seeded before June 18 in Ref. [7]. This seasonal scaling provides an effective 
reproductive number in the Northern hemisphere in the range 1.2 to 1.6 in the spring/fall 
months, in agreement with published estimates of the reproductive number. Initial 
conditions are defined by setting the start of the epidemic near La Gloria in Mexico on 18 
February 2009, as in Ref. [7] and analogously to other works [31], and following available 
data from official sources [33]. 
The above estimates of the seasonal transmission potential is obtained by using the model 
to perform maximum likelihood analysis of the parameters against the actual chronology of 
newly infected countries as detailed in Ref.[7]. The method is computationally intensive as 
it involves a Monte Carlo generation of the distribution of arrival time of the infection in 
each country based on the analysis of 1 Million worldwide simulations of the pandemic 
evolution with the GLEaM model. It is worth stressing that the model assumes 
homogeneous mixing in each subpopulation and full susceptibility. The inclusion of 
additional structures (such as e.g. subdivision in age classes) or age-specific features 
(such as age-specific transmission) are limited by the lack of data for each of the 220 
countries in the world. These assumptions represent a necessary trade-off for the 
computational efficiency of the model that allows to perform parameter estimations fitting 
the worldwide pattern of the pandemic [7], explore several scenarios under different 
conditions, and perform sensitivity analysis on the assumptions. Indeed, once the disease 
parameters and initial conditions are defined, GLEaM generates in-silico epidemics for 
which we can gather information such as prevalence, morbidity, number of secondary 
cases, number of imported cases and many others for each subpopulation with a time 
resolution of one day. All results shown in the following sections are obtained from the 
statistics based on at least 2,000 stochastic runs of the model.  
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Intervention strategies. The baseline (no intervention) scenario is studied along with 
mitigation strategies based on the use of antiviral drugs and the use of vaccines 
[12,18,30,32,34-40].  
Intervention involving vaccination is constrained on the availability and distribution of 
vaccine doses matching the novel H1N1 influenza virus. Current information on the time 
and amount of delivery of the first doses of vaccine is available for certain countries only 
and undergoes continuous updates. Significant availability of H1N1 vaccine is expected to 
begin only in mid-October or later. The United States projects to have 45M doses by 
October 15, with additional 15M doses shipped every week after that date, reaching the 
delivery of the full amount of 195M doses by the end of December [41-43]. The United 
Kingdom plans to have the first amount of 100,000 doses by mid-October, with 
subsequent distribution of additional doses till full coverage of the population [44]. Little is 
known about vaccine production rates and delivery for several other countries. Here we 
assume that all countries having stockpiled on antivirals [45] would have placed orders to 
have vaccines available to administer to their populations. Based on the available data on 
vaccination programs, we explore scenarios where the campaign starts on the same date 
for all countries with vaccines, where the date is set to October 15, November 15. 
Additional dates are also studied in the sensitivity analysis. Following previous studies on 
vaccination during the course of a pandemic [6,36,37], we assume a dynamic mass 
vaccination of 1% of the population uniformly in countries where doses are available, till 
their exhaustion. We assume the administration of a single dose of vaccine [10,46,47], 
providing protection with a delay of 2 weeks [48]. The 2 weeks time to produce the 
immune response was chosen according to the preliminary data in adult clinical studies for 
H1N1 influenza vaccine [10,48], and a sensitivity analysis reducing it to 1 week was 
performed. Recommendations foresee the use of vaccines first in the groups of population 
who are at elevated risk of severe outcomes or who are likely to come in contact with the 
novel H1N1 virus [49]. The model does not consider social structure in the subpopulations, 
therefore the effect of prioritized distribution of vaccines to health care workers, risk 
groups, and others, in reducing the number of hospitalizations and deaths [8,49-51] is out 
of the scope of the present study. Mass vaccination aims to (i) reduce susceptibility to 
infection; (ii) reduce infectiousness if infection occurs; (iii) reduce the probability of 
developing clinical symptoms [36]. The efficacy of the vaccine with respect of these three 
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effects is quantified by the parameter VES, VEI, VED, respectively.! The efficacy of the 
vaccine is still under study, therefore we refer to previous estimates and perform a 
sensitivity analysis to explore higher and lower efficacy levels. Here we consider a vaccine 
efficacy for susceptibility VES=70%, a vaccine efficacy for infectiousness VEI=30%, and a 
vaccine efficacy for symptomatic disease given infection VED=50% [8,36,52]. A full 
description of the disease dynamics in case mass vaccination is considered is available in 
the Supplementary Information. Based on the partial information on total production 
amounts per country, ranging from approximately 1/3 of the population [53-55] to 2/3 [41], 
up to full coverage [44,56,57], we explore two different mass vaccination scenarios in 
which we assume a 30% and a 60% coverage of the population.  
 
We also consider combined strategies including the systematic treatment of clinical cases 
with antiviral drugs aimed at reducing the severity of the disease and the transmissibility 
while infectious [30,32,34]. Actual data on antiviral stockpiles in the world are collected 
from Ref. [45] and from national agencies to model the current availability of the drugs by 
country. We assume the treatment with antivirals of 5% and 10% of clinical cases within 
the first day from the onset of symptoms, along with a hypothetical conservative 
intervention with the treatment of 30% of clinical cases. This parameter takes into account 
the prompt detection of symptomatic cases and the rapid administration of the drug [7,12]. 
The treatment is considered to last until resources are available. We assume a drug 
efficacy in reducing transmission equal to 62%, and a reduction of 1 day of the total 
infectious period [30,32]. A schematic illustration of the compartmental diagram including 
the combination of intervention strategies is reported in Figure 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
According to the best estimates of the model parameters as in the previous section, it is 
possible to calculate the 95% reference range for the activity peak in each country. The 
benchmark to evaluate the effect of mass vaccination campaigns is the no intervention 
scenario that is predicted to reach the activity peak e.g. in the United States between the 
beginning of October and the beginning of November. In the following we will refer to the 
early and late peak cases as the earliest and latest date, respectively, of the reference 
range for the activity peak time (see Table 1) [7]. This allows us the consideration of the 
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whole range of peak times to explore the impact of mass vaccination campaigns also in 
extreme situations such as very early activity peak in October. Although we define the late 
peak case it is important to stress that also in this case we are in the presence of an 
activity peak occurring much earlier than the usual timing of seasonal influenza. It is also 
worth remarking that the prediction for the activity peak reference range obtained in the 
model in the Northern Hemisphere differ from country to country [7], as reported in the 
Table 1 for the countries analyzed here.  
In the case of an activity peak at the beginning of the reference range provided by the 
model (early October for the US and many European countries), the mass vaccination 
program starting on October 15 with 30% coverage would have almost no effect on the 
epidemic profile, as the effective immunization of incremental 1% of the population would 
start long after the epidemic has peaked. In the case of a late peak corresponding to the 
opposite extreme of the reference range (from early to late November depending on the 
country), the peak attack rate would be reduced by a factor of about 28% averaged across 
countries, ranging from 15% to 38% depending on the specific pandemic unfolding in each 
country, with a lower reduction obtained in those countries where the epidemic would 
arrive earlier (e.g. US vs. Europe, according to the predictions of Table 1). Figures 2 and 3 
show the incidence curves for a set of countries in the early and late peak cases, 
respectively. In the US for example, the effect of mass vaccination, when no additional 
intervention strategy is implemented, would correspond to a 15% reduction of the peak 
incidence in the most favorable situation of a late peak and early vaccination campaign. If 
the availability of the first vaccine batches is delayed of 1 month, the mass vaccination 
program would have almost no mitigation effect (less than 2%) for all countries under 
study in the whole range of scenarios explored. Moreover, no major differences are 
observed with a larger coverage, given the 1% daily distribution rate, since in both the 
early and late peak extreme of the activity peak reference range the assumed 30% 
coverage would almost always be enough for the distribution during the entire epidemic 
activity, even assuming the early distribution starting on October 15. Table 1 summarizes 
the results for a set of countries which are expected to deploy vaccination programs in the 
next Fall, showing expected peak reference ranges and the relative benefit in terms of 
number of cases of each of the vaccination strategies explored at the peak time and at the 
end of the pandemic wave, with different starts of the campaigns and different coverages. 
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The percentages are calculated as the relative reductions of the maximum of the 95% 
reference range, where the interval refers to the early and late peak cases (minimum and 
maximum of the intervals, respectively). According to the above scenarios the mass 
vaccination would therefore do little against a pandemic expected to peak before or at the 
beginning of November, consistently with the simulation results on phased vaccination 
strategies in the United States [8]. 
 
The introduction of combined mitigation strategies could also help in pushing back the 
epidemic peak and make more effective the mass vaccination campaigns. Here we report 
simulations of scenarios in which the systematic use of antiviral drugs for treatment of 
cases is used to delay the epidemic peak, and to reduce the attack rate at peak time in 
combination with the vaccination campaign [12,18,30,32,34-40]. If we assume a 5% to 
10% detection of clinical cases and prompt administration of drugs, the pandemic peak is 
delayed of approximately 1-2 weeks in the countries with available antiviral stockpiles. We 
also study a possible scenario of analysis that assumes a 30% treatment, leading to 
approximately a full month delay of the pandemic peak [7]. Though larger than the 
implemented policy for the treatment of clinical cases in some countries, it allows the study 
of the effectiveness of mass vaccination campaign when a delay of one month can be 
achieved with a combination of intervention strategies. 
The delay of 1 to 2 weeks would allow an additional relative reduction of 10 to 20% of the 
peak attack rate with respect to the vaccination only scenario in case of early onset of the 
mass vaccination campaign. If we consider the early peak case, this would amount to a 
considerable reduction when compared to the approximately null benefit of the vaccination 
alone under the same conditions. The results are consistent with those obtained for the 
case of influenza peaking in the Northern Hemisphere in November and with a mass 
vaccination campaign starting at the beginning of October in Ref. [6]. Further mitigation 
effects would be obtained with a 4 weeks delay due to the antiviral treatment of 30% of the 
cases. This would allow gaining time for the immunization of a vast percentage of the 
population to take place. In the early peak situation, the benefit would range from 30% to 
59% in reducing the peak attack rate depending on the specific time evolution within each 
country, and assuming the onset of vaccination on October 15. In the late peak situation, 
the mass vaccination would be strongly effective in reducing the attack rate at peak, 
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considerably slowing down the pandemic and mitigating the cumulative number of cases 
experienced after the first wave. With respect to the maximum reduction of 38% of the 
peak attack rate in the corresponding vaccination only scenario, a delay of 4 weeks 
achieved through the combination of mitigation strategies would allow reductions up to 
88%, more than doubling the mitigation effect (see the Supplementary Information). This 
strong mitigation would correspond to a significant benefit in terms of number of cases and 
in changing the pandemic pattern, thus reducing the burden at peak time on the public 
health system. Table 2 reports the results obtained for each country when combined 
strategies with 5% and 10% treatment with antiviral drugs are considered. The results 
obtained with 30% treatment are reported in the Supplementary Information. The 
comparison between the results of Table 1 and Table 2 for the same set of assumptions 
shows that considerably larger mitigation effects would be achieved when combination of 
different interventions are considered [18,36,38,40]. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that our model assumes a 100% susceptibility in the population, 
neglecting effects of prior immunity, since no clear estimates have been provided yet [58-
60]. On the other hand, the global nature of the model allows the simulation of the 
pandemic since its start in Mexico, taking into account the population-level immunity 
caused by the first peak of the spread of pandemic H1N1 in the Northern hemisphere 
during the Spring and Summer 2009. The presented results for the simulated attack rates 
are likely overestimating the pandemic impact because of the above assumptions. With 
the best estimate parameters used here, we find clinical attack rates in absence of 
intervention policies (i.e. baseline case) of approximately 35-40% at the end of the 
epidemic. A full comparison with attack rates estimates from real data [61] is however 
made difficult along with the model assumption also by the large underascertainment of 
cases, the presence of detection biases, surveillance systems with country-specific 
capacity and coverages, as well as monitoring requirements changing in time as the 
epidemic progresses. In view of the differences in the outbreak experienced in different 
countries, we also report in the Supplementary Information the sensitivity analysis on the 
pandemic transmission potential and generation time. Changes in the effectiveness of the 
mass vaccination campaign are dependent on the anticipation or delay of the pandemic 
evolution in the Northern Hemisphere. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
Although the onset of vaccination is expected for mid-October [10,62], delays could be 
accumulated in their delivery and administration to the population. A one month delay in 
the start of the vaccination program would preclude the immunization of the public in time 
for the pandemic wave. If, on the other hand, vaccination programs are put in action 
starting on October 15 with a larger distribution rate, the mitigation effect would be 
enhanced. We ran a sensitivity analysis on the 1% incremental vaccination, doubling the 
vaccine administration rate. Results show a higher mitigation with a variation in the relative 
reduction of the peak attack rate of about 10% if compared to the corresponding 1% rate, 
in the case of a 60% vaccine coverage with combination of strategies (see the 
Supplementary Information). 
The preliminary results from the first clinical trials show that a single vaccine dose would 
produce an immune response in most adults 8 to 14 days after its administration [10,48], 
similarly to seasonal influenza vaccines. We tested therefore a reduction of the time 
needed to provide protection, assuming one week of time since the administration of the 
vaccines, with the vaccination onset in mid-October. This is effectively equivalent to a 
vaccination campaign starting one week earlier than October 15, with the same distribution 
rate to the public. The anticipation of one week – or, equivalently, the faster immunization 
process after each vaccination – would progressively provide a larger benefit in the 
mitigation of the pandemic wave, with an additional reduction of about 10% in comparison 
with the October 15 vaccination onset (see the Supplementary Information). This result 
confirms that the acceleration of vaccine administration is a key aspect to control next Fall 
wave. 
While clinical trials are under way, the efficacy of the H1N1 vaccine is still uncertain. Here 
we used as baseline values of efficacy the ones estimated for seasonal influenza 
[8,36,52], and explored a vaccine efficacy for susceptibility in the range [50%,90%], along 
with a larger vaccine efficacy for infectiousness, equal to 80% [37]. The resulting effects in 
the mitigation of the peak attack rate are limited to variations of up to 5% with respect to 
the baseline values of the efficacies, showing that the timing and distribution rates have a 
larger role in the mitigation with respect to the above variations in the efficacies. All results 
of the analysis are reported in the Supplementary Information. 
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Conclusions 
The interplay between the timing of the pandemic and the start of the dynamic vaccination 
campaign is crucial for mitigation effects. Results show that mass vaccination may have 
little effect on controlling the pandemic even when administered as early as mid-October, 
unless additional mitigation strategies are considered to delay the activity peak. This 
makes also a strong case for prioritized vaccination programs focusing on high-risk 
groups, healthcare and social infrastructure workers. Should the pandemic peak much 
later than anticipated from the modeling approach, in December or January, there would 
be enough time to provide immunization to a larger fraction of the population given the 
current schedule for vaccination campaign, with a larger mitigation effect than in the early 
pandemic wave situation. 
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Vaccination  Relative reduction of peak attack rate (%) Relative reduction of epidemic size (%) 
 
Country 
 
Baseline 
peak time 
Oct 15 
30% cov 
Oct 15 
60% cov 
Nov 15 
30% cov 
Nov 15 
60% cov 
Oct 15  
30% cov 
Oct 15 
60% cov 
Nov 15  
30% cov 
Nov 15  
60% cov 
US [Sep 23 - Nov 09] [1-15] [1-15] [0-2] [0-2] [5-25] [5-25] [1-2] [1-2] 
UK [Oct 10 - Nov 19] [1-29] [1-29] 0 [0-1] [11-30] [11-31] [1-4] [1-4] 
Canada [Oct 04 - Nov 14] [1-21] [1-21] [0-1] [0-1] [10-30] [10-32] [1-5] [1-5] 
France [Oct 11 - Nov 21] [2-32] [2-32] [0-2] [0-2] [12-32] [12-33] [1-5] [1-5] 
Italy [Oct 17 - Nov 23] [5-38] [5-38] [0-1] [0-1] [13-35] [13-36] [1-5] [1-5] 
Spain [Oct 09 - Nov 19] [1-30] [1-30] [0-1] [0-1] [11-32] [11-33] [1-4] [1-4] 
Germany [Oct 11 - Nov 20] [2-34] [2-34] [0-1] [0-1] [12-33] [12-34] [1-4] [1-4] 
(
Table 1: Relative effect of vaccination in reducing the peak attack rate and the 
epidemic size with respect to the no intervention scenario. Results show the relative 
reduction obtained with each vaccination strategy with respect to the baseline case. They 
are calculated as the relative reduction of the maximum of the 95% reference range 
obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model (vaccination strategy vs. 
baseline), and correspond to the extreme of the refernce range for the activity peak time.  
The 95% reference range of the activity peak in the no intervention scenario is also shown. 
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Combined 
strategies  
Relative reduction of peak attack rate (%) Relative reduction of epidemic size (%) 
Country 
Oct 15 
30% cov 
Oct 15 
60% cov 
Nov 15 
30% cov 
Nov 15 
60% cov 
Oct 15  
30% cov 
Oct 15 
60% cov 
Nov 15  
30% cov 
Nov 15  
60% cov 
US [2-24] [0-24] [0-2] [0-2] [9-31] [9-31] [2-4] [2-4] 
UK [5-38] [5-38] [1-2] [2-3] [15-36] [15-38] [2-7] [2-7] 
Canada [1-31] [1-31] [0-2] [0-2] [14-36] [14-39] [2-7] [2-7] 
France [7-42] [8-43] [1-2] [1-2] [15-38] [15-40] [2-7] [2-7] 
Italy [11-48] [11-48] [1-2] [1-3] [17-41] [17-44] [2-8] [2-8] 
Spain [4-41] [4-41] [1-2] [1-2] [14-38] [14-40] [2-7] [2-7] 5
%
 t
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
Germany [8-44] [7-45] [1-2] [2-3] [15-39] [15-41] [2-7] [2-7] 
 
US [1-34] [2-34] [1-3] [1-2] [13-37] [13-39] [3-6] [3-6] 
UK [12-48] [12-48] [4-5] [3-4] [19-42] [19-45] [4-10] [4-10] 
Canada [2-42] [2-42] [1-3] [0-1] [18-42] [18-48] [3-10] [3-11] 
France [14-53] [14-53] [3-4] [3-4] [20-44] [20-48] [4-11] [4-11] 
Italy [17-58] [18-58] [3-4] [3-4] [21-46] [22-52] [4-12] [4-12] 
Spain [10-51] [10-52] [2-3] [2-3] [18-44] [18-49] [3-10] [3-10] 1
0
%
 t
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
Germany [14-55] [14-55] [3-4] [3-4] [19-45] [19-50] [4-11] [4-11] 
(
Table 2: Relative effect of combined strategies in reducing the peak attack rate and 
the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention scenario. Results show the 
relative reduction obtained with each combined strategy with respect to the baseline case, 
considering the treatment with antivirals to 5% and 10% of clinical cases. The results are 
calculated as the relative reduction of the maximum of the 95% reference range obtained 
from 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model (combined strategy vs. baseline) and at the 
extreme of the activity peak time reference range reported in Table 1.  
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Figure legends 
 
 
Figure 1: Compartmental structure in each subpopulation. A susceptible individual 
interacting with an infectious person may contract the illness and enter the latent 
compartment where he is infected but not yet infectious. At the end of the latency period, 
each latent individual becomes infectious entering the symptomatic compartment with 
probability (1-pa) or becoming asymptomatic with probability pa. Asymptomatic individuals 
infect with a transmission rate reduced of r!. A fraction (1-pt) of the symptomatic individuals 
would stop traveling when ill. Infectious individuals recover permanently with rate µ. 
Antiviral treatment is assumed to be administered to a fraction pAV of the symptomatic 
infectious individuals within one day from the onset of symptoms, according to the drugs 
availability in the country. It reduces the infectiousness by the antiviral efficacy AVEI and 
shortens the infectious period of 1 day. If vaccines are available, a fraction equal to 1% of 
the susceptible population enters the susceptible vaccinated compartment each day. A 
similar progression to the baseline compartmentalization is considered if infection occurs. 
However, the vaccine reduces the susceptibility of the vaccinated susceptible with an 
efficacy VES, the probability of developing symptoms if infection occurs with an efficacy 
VED, and their transmission rate while infectious with an efficacy VEI.  All transition 
process are modeled through multinomial processes. 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of vaccination and of combined strategies for the early peak case. 
The incidence curves show the impact of an incremental vaccination with 1% daily 
distribution policy starting on October 15 for the early peak case. The baseline case is 
compared to the cases in which intervention strategies are considered – vaccination only, 
and combination of vaccination with antiviral treatment of 5%, 10%, and 30% of clinical 
cases. Efficacies of antiviral treatment and vaccination assume the values reported in the 
main text. Median profiles obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model are 
shown. A 60% vaccine coverage is assumed, with the gray bar indicating the time period 
during which the immunization takes effect.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of vaccination and of combined strategies for the late peak case. 
The incidence curves show the impact of an incremental vaccination with 1% daily 
distribution policy starting on October 15 for the late peak case. The baseline case is 
compared to the cases in which intervention strategies are considered – vaccination only, 
and combination of vaccination with antiviral treatment of 5%, 10%, and 30% of clinical 
cases. Efficacies of antiviral treatment and vaccination assume the values reported in the 
main text. Median profiles obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations of the model are 
shown. A 30% coverage is assumed, with the gray bar indicating the time period during 
which the immunization takes effect.  
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Modeling vaccination campaigns and the Fall/Winter 2009 activity 
of the new A(H1N1) influenza in the Northern Hemisphere 
 
P Bajardi, C Poletto, D Balcan, H Hu, B Gonçalves, 
JJ Ramasco, D Paolotti, N Perra, M Tizzoni, W Van den Broeck,V Colizza,A Vespignani 
 
1  Model details and calibration 
The model is fully described in the Supplementary Information (SI) of Ref. [1]. The 
demography, mobility and epidemic layers and the descriptions of the databases used are 
given in sections 1.1-1.8. The modeling of influenza seasonality and the implementation 
of the control sanitary measures adopted in Mexico are reported in sections 1.9 and 1.10, 
respectively. 
The model is calibrated according to the estimations provided in [1]. The Monte Carlo 
likelihood analysis conducted on the epidemiological data to estimate the basic 
reproductive number is fully described in section 2 of the SI of [1]. The correlation 
analysis performed to estimate the seasonality scaling factor is the subject of section 3 of 
the SI of [1]. An extensive sensitivity analysis was conducted both on the disease 
parameters (in particular many values of the generation time were explored) and on the 
model assumptions (e.g. starting date of the epidemic). We refer the reader to section 4 
of the SI of [1] for all the scenarios considered. 
In addition to the model details and calibrations based on the results of Ref. [1], here 
we consider mass vaccination alone and combined with antiviral treatment of cases as 
intervention strategies to mitigate the pandemic. Details on the implementation of the 
mass vaccination campaign and combined strategies are given in the next section. 
2  Intervention strategies 
In this section we describe the intervention strategies considered, namely the vaccination 
campaign and the antiviral drug treatment. They have been implemented extending the 
influenza-like-illness compartmentalization described in Ref. [1]. The resulting 
compartmental model is shown in Fig 1 of the main paper. Here we complete the 
description with the details of the infection dynamics. 
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2.1  Vaccination campaign 
When the mass vaccination campaign starts, a fixed number of susceptible 
(corresponding to the 1% of the population [2]) are daily vaccinated and enter in the 
susceptible vaccinated compartment. Mass vaccination aims to (i) reduce susceptibility 
to infection; (ii) reduce infectiousness if infection occurs; (iii) reduce the probability of 
developing clinical symptoms. The efficacy of the vaccine with respect of these three 
effects is quantified by the parameter VE
S
, VE
I
, VE
D
 respectively [3, 4]. A susceptible 
vaccinated individual has a susceptibility to infection rescaled of a factor (1!VE
S
). 
Given that infection occurs, a vaccinated infected individual presents clinical symptoms 
with a probability (1!p
a
)(1!VE
D
). When infectious, vaccinated individuals may infect 
susceptibles with a transmission rate reduced of a factor 1!VE
I
. 
2.2  Antiviral treatment 
Provided the administration of the drug within one day from the onset of symptoms, the 
antiviral treatment determines a reduction of the infectious period and a reduction of the 
disease transmissibility [1, 5]. The average infectious period, µ
AV
, is reduced by one day 
with respect to the infectious period of a non-treated individual [6]. The disease 
transmissibility, ", is rescaled of a factor r
AV
. This parameter is determined by the 
antiviral efficacy, AVE
I
, through the relation  
 
 r
AV
= 
1!(µ
!1
AV
!1)(1!AVE
I
)
µ!1AV
. (1) 
It represents the average probability of transmission during all the infectious period, 
considering the fact that the individual is fully infective in the first day from the onset of 
symptoms and partially infective (infectiousness reduced of a factor 1!AVE
I
) after that. 
We assume that the antiviral distribution in each country starts with a delay of 3 days 
after the appearance of the first symptomatic infectious, but not before the international 
pandemic alert dated April 26th, 2009. The distribution is implemented till the depletion 
of the country stockpile, after which the transition from latent to antiviral treated 
individuals is not allowed anymore. 
3  Sensitivity analysis on the disease parameters 
In the following we perform a sensitivity analysis on the diseases parameters, in order to 
explore the effectiveness of the mass vaccination campaign under variations of the 
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epidemiological characteristics of the infection. All results in the following refer to 
vaccination only and the vaccination campaign is assumed to start on October 15th with 
30% coverage. The lower and upper bounds of the range of generation times explored in 
reference [1] are G
t
=2.2 and G
t
=5.1. For each of these values, a maximum likelihood 
estimate of R
o
 was obtained with a Monte Carlo exploration, and the seasonality scaling 
factor was determined by means of a correlation analysis [1].  
Our sensitivity analysis focus on the G
t
=5.1 case only. Indeed the scenario with 
G
t
=2.2 would produce a very fast epidemic evolution would with a peak of the epidemic 
activity July 25th and October 22th [1]. A vaccination campaign starting in the middle of 
October would thus have only a negligible effect on the epidemic evolution. 
The scenario with G
t
=5.1 is characterized by #!1=1.1, µ!1=4.0 and R
0
=2.1. For this 
scenario we report in Table 1 the relative reduction of peak attack rate and epidemic size 
with respect to the no intervention case. The relative reduction is calculated considering 
the maximum of the 95% reference range obtained from 2,000 stochastic realizations of 
the model in the two cases. The two values reported in the table for each country, 
corresponds to the range of early to late peak cases. The results show a vaccination 
campaign more effective with respect to the case of G
t
=3.1 of the main paper, as a 
longer G
t
 would lead to a slower epidemic evolution and a later peak of the epidemic 
activity. 
Other assumptions on the disease parameters of the model include the values of p
a
 
and r
"
, which correspond to the probability of being asymptomatic and the relative 
infectiousness of asymptomatic individual, respectively. However since both p
a
 and r
"
 
enter the definition of R
0
 (see section 1.4 of the SI of [1]), the maximum likelihood 
estimate of R
0
 and G
t
 do not alter the epidemic evolution under variations of p
a
 and 
r
"
 (SI of [1]). Therefore no changes are observed in the effectiveness of vaccination with 
respect to the results of the main test. 
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis on the disease parameters, generation interval equal to 
5.1. Relative effect of vaccination only in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic 
size with respect to the no intervention scenario. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 
 30% cov 30% cov 
US [2-35] [16-32] 
UK [16-44] [21-34] 
Canada [7-42] [20-35] 
France [19-50] [22-35] 
Italy [23-54] [24-36] 
Spain [15-50] [21-35] 
Germany [20-51] [23-36] 
  
4  Sensitivity analysis on the intervention strategies 
Here we perform a sensitivity analysis of the containment strategies, in order to provide a 
range of likely interventions scenarios and relative effectiveness of vaccination. In this 
section we summarize all the cases considered: they differ from the one discussed in the 
main paper for the antiviral coverage, the vaccination protocol and the values of vaccine 
efficacy respectively.  
In the following we describe the various scenarios in detail, reporting for each of 
them a table with the relative reduction of peak attack rate and epidemic size with respect 
to the no intervention case. The two values reported in the table for each country 
correspond to the range of early to late peak cases. 
4.1  Antiviral coverage 
In Table 2 we report the results obtained with a vaccination campaign combined with an 
antiviral treatment of 30% of symptomatic infectious individuals. The results correspond 
to the relative reduction of the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the 
no intervention case for all the vaccination policies considered in the main paper: onset 
on October 15th and November 15th, and vaccination coverage of 30% and 60% for both 
the onset dates. With respect to the two coverages of 5% and 10% considered in the main 
paper, a 30% treatment rate would lead to a slower epidemic dynamic, a delay of the 
epidemic activity peak of about one month, and hence a more effectiveness of the 
vaccination campaign.  
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Table 2: 30% antiviral coverage. Relative effect of combined strategies in reducing the 
peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention scenario. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 Nov 15 Nov 15 Oct 15 Oct 15 Nov 15 Nov 15 
 30% cov 60% cov 30% cov 60% cov 30% cov 60% cov 30% cov 60% cov 
US [30-77] [30-77] [5-14] [5-14] [38-60] [38-73] [11-26] [11-27] 
UK [49-81] [50-81] [13-27] [13-27] [45-61] [47-75] [17-30] [17-31] 
Canada [36-82] [36-82] [4-21] [4-21] [44-63] [47-80] [15-34] [16-35] 
France [51-85] [52-85] [11-31] [12-31] [47-61] [49-79] [18-33] [18-34] 
Italy [58-85] [59-88] [13-36] [13-36] [51-63] [54-84] [18-36] [18-37] 
Spain [48-85] [49-87] [9-31] [9-32] [46-63] [49-82] [16-35] [16-36] 
Germany [54-85] [54-88] [12-34] [12-34] [48-62] [51-82] [17-34] [17-35] 
  
4.2  Vaccination protocols 
For the sensitivity analysis on the vaccination protocols we have considered three 
different situations. Each of them presents a variation in a specific aspect of the 
vaccination policy, maintaining unchanged the other parameters. The two cases 
considered are: (i) an immune response time of 7 days after the vaccine administration, 
(ii) a vaccine distribution to 2% of the population per day. The vaccination was assumed 
to be combined with antiviral treatment unless specified. For the whole sensitivity 
analysis here reported we focus on the scenario with the early onset of vaccination 
campaign (Oct 15) and an antiviral coverage of 30% of symptomatic infected individuals, 
which is expected to produce the larger reduction in number of cases as discussed in the 
main paper. 
Shorter immune response 
Early clinical trials show that the immune response seems to be delayed of 8 to 14 days 
after the vaccine administration. In the main paper we have considered two weeks time 
to produce the immune response, while here we show the results obtained with an 
immune response time of one week. In the early peak scenario, the effectiveness of the 
vaccination campaign is enhanced with an additional reduction of about 10% (Table 3) in 
comparison with the two weeks time case. In the late peak scenario only a small 
improvement is observed.  
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Table 3: Shorter immune response. Relative effect of combined strategies in reducing 
the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention scenario, 
assuming that the vaccine immune response is equal to 1 week. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 
 30% cov 30% cov 
US [43-86] [45-63] 
UK [62-86] [53-63] 
Canada [50-85] [51-66] 
France [65-85] [54-64] 
Italy [71-84] [57-65] 
Spain [62-85] [54-65] 
Germany [67-84] [56-64] 
  
Larger vaccine distribution daily rate 
In order to assess the impact of a larger daily rate of administration of the vaccine to the 
population, we present the results obtained doubling the daily vaccine distribution. In 
Table 4 we show the relative reduction of the peak attack rate and of the epidemic size of 
the combined vaccination-antiviral strategy with respect to the no intervention scenario. 
The benefit given by the containment measures would increase, with an additional 
reduction of about 5-10% with respect to the case of 1% of population daily vaccinated. 
In order to test the effectiveness a larger vaccine distribution daily rate in absence of 
antiviral treatment, in Table 5 we show the results for the vaccination campaign only. 
These results show the limited benefit of a containment intervention based exclusively 
on vaccinations, with no other mitigation strategies implemented (such as e.g. social 
distancing or antiviral treatment). 
4.3  Vaccine efficacy 
Since the efficacy of H1N1 vaccine is still uncertain, the vaccine efficacy parameters 
used in the model were selected according to the estimates for seasonal influenza [3, 4, 7, 
8]. 
Sensitivity analysis has been performed on the vaccine efficacy for susceptibility and 
on vaccine efficacy for infectiousness. We explored two cases for the susceptibility 
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(VE
s
=0.9 and VE
s
=0.5), and one case for the infectiousness (VE
I
=0.8). The scenario 
considered is characterized by an early onset of vaccination campaign (Oct 15) and an 
antiviral coverage of 30% of symptomatic infected individuals. The resulting effects in 
the mitigation of the peak attack rate with respect to the baseline values are less than 5% 
for the late peak scenario. 
 
Table 4: Larger vaccine distribution daily rate. Relative effect of combined strategies 
in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention 
scenario, assuming a daily vaccination rate equal to 2% population. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 Oct 15 Oct 15 
 30% cov 60% cov 30% cov 60% cov 
US [35-87] [35-87] [45-64] [48-86] 
UK [56-86] [56-89] [53-64] [60-88] 
Canada [42-85] [42-90] [51-67] [60-91] 
France [60-85] [60-91] [55-64] [64-90] 
Italy [68-84] [68-95] [58-65] [70-94] 
Spain [56-85] [56-93] [54-66] [63-93] 
Germany [63-84] [63-95] [56-64] [66-93] 
  
 
Table 5: Larger vaccine distribution daily rate. Vaccination only. Relative effect of 
vaccination only in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to 
the no intervention scenario, assuming a daily vaccination rate equal to 2% population. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 
 30% cov 30% cov 
US [3-19] [8-33] 
UK [2-36] [14-39] 
Canada [2-27] [13-38] 
France [3-42] [15-41] 
Italy [5-50] [16-44] 
Spain [1-39] [13-41] 
Germany [3-45] [14-43] 
)# #6,7)8)*1-9,46,#/$%((/,%(,)$6!
 
  
 
Table 6: Vaccine efficacy for susceptibility 90%. Relative effect of combined strategies 
in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention 
scenario. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 Oct 15 Oct 15 
 30% cov 60% cov 30% cov 60% cov 
US [30-79] [30-79] [39-68] [39-77] 
UK [49-83] [49-83] [47-69] [48-79] 
Canada [35-84] [37-84] [46-72] [48-84] 
France [51-87] [51-87] [49-70] [50-82] 
Italy [58-90] [58-90] [53-72] [56-87] 
Spain [48-89] [48-89] [48-72] [50-86] 
Germany [54-90] [54-90] [51-71] [52-86] 
  
 
Table 7: Vaccine efficacy for susceptibility 50%. Relative effect of combined strategies 
in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention 
scenario. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 
 60% cov 60% cov 
US [28-73] [36-67] 
UK [47-78] [43-70] 
Canada [34-78] [43-75] 
France [48-82] [45-73] 
Italy [54-86] [49-78] 
Spain [44-84] [43-77] 
Germany [50-84] [45-76] 
  
 
!"##$%&%'()*+,-'./*&)(-/&0,&/1%$-'2,3)44-')(-/',4)&#)-2'!55, *!
 
  
Table 8: Vaccine efficacy for infectiousness 80%. Relative effect of combined 
strategies in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no 
intervention scenario. 
 
 Relative reduction Relative reduction 
 of peak attack rate (%) of epidemic size (%) 
Country Oct 15 Oct 15 
 60% cov 60% cov 
US [30-79] [39-76] 
UK [49-83] [48-79] 
Canada [35-84] [47-83] 
France [51-86] [50-82] 
Italy [57-90] [55-87] 
Spain [48-88] [49-85] 
Germany [52-89] [50-85] 
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